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MANAGED CARE-THE FIRST CHAPTER
COMES TO A CLOSE
Sallyanne Payton*

The articles in this Symposium present a fair snapshot of the
state of mainstream academic thinking about managed care as of
the fall of 1999. Mainstream academic theorizing about health care
and health insurance has been generally favorable to managed
care: the conventional wisdom of health policy is that integrating
the insurance and provider functions holds the best promise of
correcting the inefficiencies and market imperfections of fee-forservice medicine financed through third-party indemnity payment,
and of stimulating the provision of medically effective care at a
price and quality for which consumers would be willing to pay out
of their own funds. This conviction has grown at a time of general
valorization of "markets," meaning price competition among forprofit commercial enterprises, as the vehicle for stimulating innovation and achieving efficiencies. In this view, managed care, in the
form of fully-integrated medical care organizations, is an elegant
comprehensive solution to the enormous and enormously complex
problems of the health care sector, bringing to medical care delivery the discipline of private commercial business.
This view has dominated discussion among health policy
experts. Within the framework of this general approach, the task of
health policy as it pertains to law and regulation is to design a legal
regime to support the efficiency-enhancing functions of managed
care while bringing the industry within the reach of the
fundamental legal standards and values that are pervasive in
American law. The challenge is to integrate managed care into the
fabric of the law without destroying it as a result of adopting
normative premises that are inconsistent with managed care itself.
As Peter Jacobson and Scott Pomfret point out in their Article in
this Symposium, the courts (and legislatures) have historically
faced this challenge with respect to other emerging industries that
represent radical transformations in the nature of basic production
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processes.' Jacob Hacker and Theodore Marmor remind us that
the term "managed care" is itself a largely undefined term with a
strongly positive normative implication that "is a confused
assemblage of sloganeering, aspirational rhetoric, and businessschool jargon, 2 that ought to be replaced in health policy
discussions by "more precise and neutral conceptual tools with
which to evaluate changes in modern medicine's reimbursement3
methods, managerial techniques, and organizational forms."
Fortunately for this Symposium, our authors' discussions do in fact
get right down to the operational level, legal analysis being
notoriously impervious to slogans in its focus on actual transactions
and legal relations. It should come as no surprise that the principal
challenges to "managed care" are coming from courts and lawyers,
who are penetrating the rhetoric to argue about the application of
principles of contract and tort in the new medical economy.
In the case of managed care, some of the most hotly contested
issues have to do with just this fundamental level of legal principle,
captured in the ideas that individuals ought to be required to perform in accordance with the promises that they make and ought to
be accountable to those whom they injure. Because managed care
rearranges the economic relationships between and among patients, physicians and payers, mainly with the intention and effect
of encouraging physicians to incorporate into their medical decisions financial considerations of the type that concern payers,
managed care forces a reconsideration of much of the law of
medical practice and the professional standards and ethics of the
medical profession itself. Haavi Morreim attacks the main issue: to
what extent should a managed care organization that seeks to influence clinical decision making be regarded as practicing
medicine itself and therefore be held to the standards applicable
to clinical professionals? 4 Professor Morreim suggests, at the end of
her comprehensive analysis of the issues, that managed care organizations should contract to provide disclosed processes of and
standards for medical decision making, as by adopting clinical
guidelines, but should leave the actual clinical decisions to those

1.
See generally, Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, EstablishingNew Legal Doctrinein
Managed Care: A Model of JudicialResponse to Industrial Change, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813
(1999).
2.
Jacob S.Hacker & Theodore R. Marrnor, How Not to Think About "Managed Care,"
32 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 661, 662-63 (1999).
3.
Id. at 663.
4.
See E. Haavi Morriem, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practiceand Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 939 (1999).
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with primary responsibility for making them.5 Eugene Grochowski
contributes a reflection on the ethical responsibilities of physicians
in a managed care environment.6 Marc Rodwin deploys Albert 0.
Hirschmann's famous distinction between and among "exit,"
"voice," and "loyalty" to illuminate some of the difficulties facing
consumers and patients in managed care plans.7
Enthusiasm for erecting expanded systems of health coverage
partly or wholly on the foundation of integrated organizations that
both assume insurance risk and arrange for the provision of medical services has forced a closer look at the problems of designing
systems of insurance regulation adequate to the task of assuring
coverage for higher-risk patients in the face of private insurers' incentives to engage in risk selection. In this Symposium are three
contributions that address these regulatory problems. Mark Hall,
in his empirical study of the effect in seven states of state insurance
reform laws designed to stabilize and expand coverage in the smallgroup market, reaches the conclusion that the results of those reforms do not repay the optimism of advocates who had hoped that
various regulatory measures might counteract insurers' tendencies
to engage in risk selection and other forms of regulatory evasion.
Timothy Jost, in his study of health care financing and insurance
regulation in Chile, reaches similar conclusions. 9 Eleanor Kinney,
using Indiana's experience, observes that states, faced with the dynamic of competitive federalism and taxpayer resistance to higher
taxes, have difficulty generating out of their own resources the
revenues required to provide to the uninsured either coverage or
adequate care.' ° She advocates rethinking federal-state relations in
both funding and regulation, with special emphasis on the problems caused to the states by the existence of employer self-funding
under ERISA. These three studies are discouraging even when
read individually; taken together they suggest the need to reconsider the strategy of using commercial insurance markets under
state regulation as the principal mechanism for providing coverage
5.
See id.
6.
See Eugene C. Grochowski, Ethical Issues in Managed Care: Can the TraditionalPhysician-PatientRelationship Be Preserved in the Era of Managed Care or Should It Be Replaced by a
GroupEthic?, 32 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 619 (1999).
7.
See Marc A. Rodwin, Exit and Voice in American Health Care, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
1041 (1999).
8.
See Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws,
32 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 685 (1999).

9.
See Timothy S. Jost, Managed Care Regulation: Can We Learn from Others? The Chilean
Experience, 32 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 863 (1999).
See Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearing the Way for an Effective Federal-StatePartnership in
10.
HealthReform, 32 U. MicH.J.L. REFORM 899 (1999).
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or achieving adequate risk pooling. David Hyman contributes a
cautionary note about imposing government regulation and conventional tort liability on managed care plans, pointing out that
regulation and liability are not themselves cost-free and bring with
them their own set of failures."
Finally, Peter Hammer, writing both alone and with William
Sage, argues that economic changes in the health care industry are
challenging antitrust courts to think more carefully about the role
of non-price competition in economic analysis of hospital mergers,
and indeed the role of non-price competition generally in consumer welfare, a problem that has generally been submerged in
the assumption that price competition encompasses, and therefore
accounts for, non-price competition. 12
All of these authors have set for themselves the goal of reforming managed care, creating legal structures to contain some of its
more destructive tendencies without confronting the nature of
managed care itself. Physicians and patients are more skeptical,
however, and are expressing their doubts through the political system. The defeat of the Clinton Administration's national health
insurance initiative of 1993-94 is attributable in part to the public's
wariness about the implications of obtaining their care through
HMO-type health plans, which would have been the principal vehicles for medical service delivery under the Clinton Plan.
The essential background of this Symposium, as of the reform
effort to which it contributes, is that the defeat of the Clinton Plan
did not defeat the idea of managed care but rather marked the
beginning of a decisive and dramatic turn to managed care on the
part of the private sector. In just a few years after the failure of the
national health insurance initiative, private employers have virtually discontinued traditional unfettered indemnity fee-for-service
type coverage. Physicians and patients now frequently find themselves contending with management by health care organizations
with many different styles of economic and functional integration.
This change has taken place mainly in the universe of private employee benefit plans, which serve well over 100 million workers and
their families; these programs and the management entities that
serve them are the principal targets of the current drive to
"reform" managed care. Managed care has entered the main11.
See David A. Hyman, Accountable Managed Care: Should We Be Careful What We Wish
For?, 32 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 785 (1999).
12.
See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Competing on Quality of Care: The Need to
Develop a Competition Policy for Health Care Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1069 (1999);
PeterJ. Hammer, Questioning TraditionalAntitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-price Competition
in HospitalMarkets, 32 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 727 (1999).
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stream medical marketplace in a form that is more vigorous, entrepreneurial, innovative, and disorderly than would have been
allowed under the terms of the pervasively-regulated, interestgroup-bargained managed competition regime projected by the
Clinton Plan.
Things have not gone well. Events in the managed care industry
are already suggesting that entrepreneurial managed care needs to
be not only reformed but rethought. Commercial insurance companies and other managed care entities that have invested heavily
in creating the capacity to meet the demand for managed care
have had less success than they expected. In the HMO industry
there have been many business failures, withdrawals from markets,
and price increases that reveal the difficulty of actually controlling
medical costs. Farther down the chain of commercial risk-bearing
entities, capitated physicians' practices and physician practice
management firms have found themselves in financial difficulty. In
the public programs that have relied on managed care organizations, exit of suppliers is frequent and prices are rising. Even as
private for-profit enterprises are doing less well than they expected,
the nonprofit institutions that have historically been the stable
providers of coverage and care are finding it difficult to operate in
the commercialized marketplace and are themselves coming under
threat of absorption by for-profit firms, are assuming for-profit
form, or are being forced to behave like their entrepreneurial
competitors. Meanwhile, the backlash against managed care has
taken the form of serious bipartisan reform efforts in both state
legislatures and the Congress.
Against what norm should these events be considered troubling?
Patient and physician resistance to managed care was anticipated,
because physicians and patients had been taught by indemnity insurance to engage in over-consumption that managed care
attempts to correct. Some backlash was to be expected, and so the
fact of backlash does not suggest a mistake in basic policy, although
it does suggest a need to make some adjustments in the legal and
regulatory regimes. Under-pricing is common where firms jockey
for market share: casualties are to be expected. What is more surprising is that adequate management of medical services is proving
so difficult to achieve. The difficulties are not confined to particular firms, management styles, markets, regions, or sizes of firms.
Failure is pandemic. Markets are volatile. The industry-wide failure
of managed care actually to manage either the delivery of care or
the cost of care calls into question the entire set of ideas about
medical markets that have in the last few decades guided public
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policy and private investment. This is very serious indeed, not to be
cured simply by providing more revenue to managed care firms
anxious to raise their prices. The condition of the new medical
market casts doubt on the wisdom and even the workability of all
the policy initiatives that contemplate that medical services should
be supplied mainly through firms that integrate insurance and
medical service delivery functions.
There have been many such ideas, most notably the national
health insurance plan proposed by President Clinton in the first
year of his administration. In the past several years a number of
states have turned more decisively to managed care for their Medicaid populations
and the Congress has enacted the
Medicare+Choice program, which its advocates expected to displace fee-for-service Medicare. Managed care promised to bring
mainstream business practices to health care, to capture for the
health services sector the "market"-favoring techniques applied
successfully to the problems of other areas historically dominated
by governments, state or quasi-state enterprises, government regulation, and tax financing. For public programs, such as Medicare,
Medicaid, or a new national health insurance system, managed
care held out the possibility of enlisting private enterprise in the
business of managing directly the purchase or delivery of services,
moving government back a step to the role of financier. Because
managed care was associated with efficiency values, it also created
for the first time in health services delivery a legitimate role for forprofit enterprise, as an instrument for correcting the inefficiencies
created by nonprofits and governments. The innovators, therefore,
in the rush to managed care that occurred after the failure of the
Clinton Plan, have mainly been the organizers of new economic
relationships: the HMOs, the insurance companies, the network
organizers and administrators, the physician practice management
firms, and sometimes the third-party payers themselves.
This first generation of managed care plans based on these ideas
is in the process of failing, and the question is what to think now
and do next. One obvious explanation for the failure is that the
work of integration and reconfiguration did not reach sufficiently
down from the contracting level, where there has been much innovation in devising new techniques of integrating services
financially in order to make the contracting process more efficient,
to the functional level where the task is clinical integration and actual improvement of practice. Nor did the concept of closelyintegrated exclusive managed care organizations resonate with the
public. Most managed care is supplied through private employee
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benefit plans, and consequently has had to meet the test of employee and employer acceptance in a marketplace driven by health
benefits purchasing on the part of employer-based group health
plans. Consumers' dislike of closed-panel plans has led their employers to encourage alternatives based on looser styles of
integration, such as Preferred Provider Organizations and Point of
Service plans. These looser networks, however, have had difficulty
managing medical services sufficiently well to be economically viable.
There is an irony in this failure. "Managed care" as promoted by
health policy experts was intended to bring market discipline to
health coverage and health care delivery within a transition to a
national health insurance system. However, in the market for furnishing services to private employer-based health plans, which is
the only health care market that functions largely independently of
government regulation, the closed-panel style of managed care
preferred by the experts has proven problematic and the looser
styles preferred by the patients have proven unprofitable. Taking
the judgment of the actual market to be suggestive, if not conclusive, this experience points to the need to ask fundamental
questions, in order to take a closer look at basic principle.

FUNDAMENTALS

The null state-the state of nature, so to speak-in health services, to which policy is applied, would be a market in which
government neither attempts to regulate relationships nor subsidizes demand or supply, and limits itself to enforcing, through the
judicial system, agreements between contracting parties in accordance with their legitimate expectations as determined through
the use of common law principles. In such a market, any person
may hold out himself or herself to be a healer and may try to persuade patients of the efficacy of the service and of his or her own
competence and trustworthiness. Patients will pay out of their own
pockets, which means that (a) individuals will decide for themselves what they want and how much they are willing to pay for it;
and (b) more expensive services can be afforded only by the more
affluent, the more subsidized, or those receiving them through
charity; otherwise they must be financed from the surplus extracted from paying patients through price discrimination, i.e., the
traditional "sliding scale." Patients will not have good information
on which to judge the quality of the service, or even the need for it,
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except perhaps as they start in distress and end with some positive
change. The practitioner's actual art will be opaque; reputations
made by individual healers may take on the character of folklore.
Capital is difficult to accumulate in this kind of market, and it is
difficult for individuals in private practice to find the time and the
financial ease that might allow them to engage in study and innovation, in teaching, writing, and building an organized profession
with a canonical literature and a defined art. Physicians have
tended to find economic shelter in such markets by making themselves useful to the holders of wealth and power, arranging to be
supported by the state, the aristocracy, the church, the university,
and other institutions that can provide consistent sustenance and a
patient base. Another technique is to seek special privileges and
monopolies for their private practice. The government's conferring of monopoly power is an endorsement of the profession's
claim to competence and importance to the public interest. Where
the profession actually has a legal monopoly it can both invoke the
power of the state to prosecute those who attempt to practice without a license and decide who shall be allowed to practice with a
license. Those admitted to practice with a license therefore come
to the public with the imprimatur of the profession itself and acquire immediately a portion of the reputation of the profession as
a whole. The combination of licensed monopoly and good reputation can yield a very comfortable living; the learned professions
have aspired to make it possible for their members to live like gentlemen.
Monopoly or no, the challenge for any industry that is basically a
handicraft is large-scale capital accumulation. In the interest of
making certain that individual practice is economically viable, the
ethics of the medical profession have prevented physicians from
creating large organizations with hierarchies of physicians and
other caregivers, even though the creation of such organizations
has been financially as well as technically practicable since the rise
of third-party payment. Individual practitioners may become
wealthy, but it has not been possible within the rules of the profession to build large organizations in which professional and other
labor is rationalized and surplus is captured by a single owner of
the organization. The medical profession consequently has longstanding alliances with religious, community, educational, and
governmental institutions that can generate capital from sources
other than patient fees. The expensive equipment and facilities
required for in-patient practice have been supplied through hospitals that have traditionally been religious or charitable institutions.
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Medical education took a leap forward in terms of sophistication
and cost when the medical elites joined with private foundations
and universities to move medical education out of mail-order and
storefront entrepreneurship and into the universities. Foundations, governments, universities, and private corporations have
funded most medical research. The medical profession's collaboration with these religious, charitable, and governmental institutions
has helped physicians in private practice to claim association with
commitment to public service and learning, which contributes to a
public perception of their own trustworthiness.
This combination of institutions created the base on which the
market for hospital care was built, making it realistic for the hospitals to create hospitalization insurance in order to stabilize their
cash flows during the Depression years of the 1930s, and then making such coverage attractive for employers to supply as a fringe
benefit of employment during World War II when cash wages and
prices were frozen by the government. After the war, advances in
medical efficacy centering on improved surgical techniques and
drugs made modern, scientific medical care a highly desired item
of consumption, and health coverage a desirable fringe benefit of
employment for workers at large. Employer-based health coverage
funneled billions of dollars into the medical services sector and
made possible modern medicine as we know it. Government health
programs have mainly imitated the private programs, in the name
of assuring that their benefit structures should make it possible for
their beneficiaries to have equal access to services. Private employer-based health benefit programs have thus driven innovation
in coverage as well as in medicine itself.
Harnessed to the economic engine of indemnity coverage with
provider payment on a fee-for-service basis without provider price
competition, the constant search for technical improvement on
the part of these sophisticated, linked institutions produced both
great strides and runaway costs. The resulting markets appear,
from the vantage point of conventional economic expectations, to
be distorted and inefficient. It should not be thought, however,
that if the distortions were withdrawn the markets would right
themselves and the nation would experience, by the working of
some invisible hand, technologically advanced and efficiently organized medical care. Large-scale scientific research and education must
always be funded by entities other than practicing professionals, and
access to medical services must continue to be extended by some
non-market means to those who are not well-off. Therefore the appropriate allocation of function between market and non-market
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mechanisms is necessarily a matter of public policy in any nation
that wants scientific medicine and universal access. In other industrialized countries, governments have solved the problem by
making health care part of government policy and finance rather
than part of the ordinary market, even when the providers are private professionals and institutions. In this country, the private and
public sectors together have created a set of institutions that provide private and public health financing, service delivery,
regulation, research, and education. Without this network of institutions the medical art itself would be much poorer and the
market for medical practice thinner and less well-organized.
The central institution in this web of support has been the private employee welfare and health benefit plan, because the
purchasing strategies of the large employer-based plans have complemented the aspirations of the medical elites. Employers and
employee associations have tended to take a long view of their interests, which include providing to the populations they serve
medical services that are constantly improving, a stance encouraged by the fact that employer-paid health benefits are not
included in employee income for federal tax purposes. The consequent generosity of private sector plans, which by enabling
constant intensification of care has pushed up standards of practice, has precipitated indirectly a crisis in public finance because
governments obligated themselves to pay for equivalent service for
their beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid. These programs have claimed increasing shares of public resources and have
threatened governments' ability to finance other essential public
services. By the 1980s the escalating cost of health care was a principal economic issue facing the country, affecting American
industry's ability to compete in the world economy and American
governments' ability to govern.
Managed care and managed competition were supposed to have
been the solution to these problems. The root cause of the inflationary pressure seemed to be in the private sector, where
employers seemed to be supplying too much health coverage and
employees consuming too much health care. Employers frequently
supplied health benefits without informing employees of their cost
or giving them incentives to be frugal in their resource consumption. Many employees were unaware that the money being spent
on their health benefits was part of their compensation and therefore might, if health care costs were lower, be paid to them as cash
wages. Mainstream economic analysis set out to solve this problem.
Fatefully, the diagnosis of the situation having been grounded in a
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failure of rational purchasing at the level of the individual, the solution proposed was itself situated in the individualistic tradition of
microeconomics: the idea was that the market for employerprovided health coverage might be made more efficient-i.e., the
total amount of health coverage supplied and the price paid for it
could be made to approximate the amount that would be demanded by employees if they were spending their own money-if
the employees were informed of the price of coverage and given
incentives to select lower-cost, less full-featured benefit packages.
This reasoning led to an argument for creating individualistic markets within employer-based employee benefit plans by offering
choices in coverage options and prices. The net result would be a
hybrid scheme in which a group might use its purchasing power to
obtain size-related favorable prices, while the actual level of its demand would be the aggregate of the individual decisions of its
members made in a properly-structured internal market.
The second culprit in the health care inflationary dynamic being
indemnity fee-for-service provider compensation, which had
exacerbated the moral hazard effects that attend any system of
third-party payment, the other principal reform proposed was to
integrate insurer and provider functions in order to place a check
on utilization and to create incentives to ever-greater operating
efficiencies by embarking upon functional and economic integration of the providers themselves. Managed care and managed
competition were thus linked: the most efficient arrangement
would be one in which the supply of medical service would be
made efficient by managed care and demand in the market would
be made rational by managed competition. This link was the
premise and principle of the Clinton Plan.
Health policy is complicated. Correcting the unfortunate consequences of the practice of indemnification became a problem to
be solved simultaneously with the failure of the employer-based
system to create adequate access to coverage for the private workforce. By the 1980s this failure was leading to a troubling rate of
increase in the numbers of uninsured workers, most of them selfemployed individuals or employees of smaller businesses. The
shortcomings of the employer-based system led to hopes on the
part of advocates of national health insurance that a governmentsponsored system might finally be created, the effort to reform the
system of payment focused on inefficiencies and inequities in the
private sector and began with an indictment of the employer-based
system generally. The Clinton Plan expressed this dissatisfaction
with the performance of the private sector by proposing to replace
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the employer-based system with a complex government-supervised
system based on government-managed competition among regulated managed care plans.
Ironically, then, the essentially private but non-market system of
employer-based coverage was attacked by the government in the
name of efficiency, which was to be achieved through a combination of government regulation and private markets in which
commercial businesses, namely for-profit managed care organizations, would dominate. Thus the relatively unregulated market,
which had evolved a complex of non-market and quasi-market institutions in order to create a market for high-quality medical
services, was assaulted in the name of a scheme that was simultaneously more governmental and more commercial, powered by a
conviction that health care markets could be improved by enlisting
the profit motive in some of its crudest forms. "Comprehensive
health care reform" actually meant dismantling the private
employer-based plans, bringing the employees into a governmentmanaged system, instituting price controls on medical service providers, creating regional risk pools that would allow higher-risk
customers access to coverage, rationalizing the rate of technological
advance by requiring that new technologies be demonstrably more
effective than old ones, and reducing costs by reducing the amount
of care the cost of which might exceed the medical benefit to the
patient. Anticipating that accomplishing all of this by direct regulation would require politically unacceptable levels of power and
unachievable levels of skill on the part of government, President
Clinton proposed to enlist private businesses as the organizers of
medical services: all coverage in the Clinton Plan was to have been
supplied through regulated insurer-provider organizations, most of
them anticipated to be for-profit entities.
In the aftermath of the defeat of the Clinton Plan the legislative
effort to create a comprehensive system has slowed to a pace of
opportunistic incrementalism, but enthusiasm for fundamental
reform of the medical marketplace still tends to dominate health
policy on both the political left and the political right. Neither the
friends of government nor the friends of free enterprise approve of
employer-based coverage in its present form, and tend to use it as a
foil for their own more theoretically coherent policy preferences.
The fully-integrated HMO remains the idealized solution as a vehicle for coverage and service delivery, and both liberals and
conservatives continue to advocate the creation of purchasing
groups that will manage a competition among health plans for the
patronage of their members. The result is that the combination of
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the preference of government planners for a government-managed
health care system and the preference of free-market advocates for
one that looks more like a real market deprives the actual institutions of the health care sector of normative status as serviceable
ways of doing business that might be in need of improvement
rather than abolition. Existing institutions are described mainly to
be denounced. Policy experts have been concerned so urgently
with the failings of employer-based health coverage, compared with
the potential advantages of an efficient market or a governmentmanaged system, that they have not focused on the advantages of
the employer-based health coverage system compared with the failings of commercial markets and government systems. The same is
true of their attitudes toward the nonprofit institutions that have
dominated the health care sector: because the nonprofits engineered the web of voluntary and governmental restraints on
innovation and competition in medical services, they tend to be
identified with intrinsically anti-market rather than marketpromoting forces. Less appreciated are the advantages of nonprofits in the health care market, reaching to the likelihood that
they have created the market for health services that could not
have emerged from commercial for-profit enterprise.
The failure of the current generation of managed care should
alert us to the need to reconsider this hostility toward existing institutions. 13 Granted, policy likes ideas and tends to criticize
arrangements that have more the flavor of pragmatic adaptations
than of deliberate strategies; but adaptations may point to problems in the structures to which adaptation is made, and apparently
ad hoc adaptations may be seen as an emergence of rational and
coherent action, and therefore more theoretically defensible, as
the context is better understood. Both the demand and the supply
sides of the existing medical marketplace are full of institutions that
are hybrids or anomalies, if viewed in the light of conventional general theory, but that work quite well in practice. An employer-based
health plan, for example, is difficult to characterize in theoretical
terms. The plan neither sells benefits to employees nor purchases on
their behalf as agent. Plan administrators are fiduciaries while the
plan sponsor is free to pursue its own self-interest in designing
13.
Professor Kinney expresses a view held by many who hope to accomplish riskpooling through state or federal government action: the self-funded employee benefit plans,
governed by ERISA, do not participate in state taxation designed to fund the uninsured; nor
are they subject to state insurance mandates that require coverage, and therefore riskpooling, for certain categories of health expenditures. See Kinney, supra note 10, at 924.
Mental health benefits, for example, are frequently not covered or are only partially covered
by employers unless forced by regulation to provide such coverage. See id. at 934.
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benefits. The employee's correlative interest is something like a
property right and something like a contract right, is partly protected by the common law and partly by a confused and oddly
limited set of remedies under ERISA. Similarly difficult to characterize are the nonprofit corporations of the voluntary sector,
which, standing between the state and the market, have been the
organizing institutions of the health care sector. These are puzzling to political theorists because they perform public functions
without being part of governance through political representation
in the state; and they are mainly ignored in conventional economic
literature, not being quite part of the apparatus of capitalism.
These voluntary institutions have shown, perhaps precisely because of their hybrid qualities, great flexibility and resourcefulness
in taking on the tasks of governing and managing the medical services sector and creating its economy. Charitable organizations can,
consistent with their tax-exempt status, engage in market transactions, and thus can organize and deliver medical services. Because
any surplus they make must be used for charitable purposes, i.e.,
may not be distributed to shareholders, a nonprofit's principal way
of acquiring capital from outside sources is to solicit gifts and incur
debt rather than to raise risk capital in the equity markets. Nonprofit corporations are therefore not responsive to the interests of
equity capital in determining their business strategies, and do not
conform to conventional economic models because their principal
institutional purpose is the pursuit of the objectives to which their
charters dedicate them, not the pursuit of profit for the purpose of
paying returns to shareholders. They are in but not of the market.
Conversely, employers are deeply of the market. Employer-based
health benefit plans are part of intracorporate governance structures, which are private relationships; but because these plans
organize the demand side of the health care market and make
health coverage practicable they perform what would otherwise be
a function of government.
The consequence of the theoretical muddle created by the
institutions supplying and purchasing health benefits is that
employer-based health coverage tends to be treated as an accident
of history, the product of the nation's failure to construct an
adequate state-managed system such as those found in peer
nations. In actuality, however, both government management of
health care and the kind of hybrid arrangements invented in the
United States are responses to the failures of private commercial
markets, and the employer-based system of group coverage
coupled with the voluntary system of delivering medical services
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through nonprofit institutions has succeeded, differently but
perhaps not less well than government might have, in overcoming
or counteracting many of the intrinsic imperfections of
commercial markets for health care and health coverage.
Ironically, much of the objection to these hybrids is that they have
succeeded too well, transforming individualized markets whose
underlying tendency is under-consumption, because of consumer
distrust of providers and lack of effective demand in the absence of
a financing mechanism, into organized markets whose tendency is
over-consumption.
The markets need to be turned toward greater efficiency, but
carefully. Commercialized health care delivery and individualized
insurance markets are now valorized as antidotes to employerbased group coverage and nonprofit health care delivery; but it
must be remembered that commercial health care and individualized markets for insurance were originally the problems to which
the nonprofit hospital system of delivery and the employer-based
system of coverage were the solutions. Policy that would reverse
direction at this stage should be approached with care because
commercialized health care and individualized health insurance
seem likely to produce markets that will fail. It is particularly important to resist the temptation to think that government
management would be tolerable were it to be coupled to private
delivery systems, as where government programs might provide
premium support to enable beneficiaries to purchase services from
private HMOs. A government-managed program that relies on
commercial HMOs as its delivery vehicle combines the failures of
government with the failures of commercialism. A government
program that might attempt to engage in large-scale direct administration, such as one that would scale up Medicare fee-for-service to
cover the population under sixty-five or use the Federal Employees
Health Benefit Program as a platform for a national health insurance system operated through managed competition, would
require administrative capacities in government that would be
somewhat beyond what the public seems willing to support, in addition to both politicizing the health care delivery process and
bringing health care issues into the center of political life. It is too
easy to "reform" arrangements that work imperfectly into new arrangements that are even less satisfactory.
This does not mean that retreat from government management
and private commercialism must lead back to fee-for-service
indemnity arrangements in economically unintegrated markets.
That approach has been abandoned decisively by both public and

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 32:4

private payers determined not to tolerate the expense that such
arrangements entail. From the payers' point of view, whose distress
stimulated interest in managed care, the new cost-containment
strategies must at least be regarded as a temporary success. The
crisis is no longer a crisis of cost as experienced by payers. Acute
distress has now been distributed. There are problems of the
uninsured and of those providers that render uncompensated care
to them; the failures of so many organizations that have stepped up
to assume business and insurance risk; the volatility of markets for
health coverage; and the increasing unhappiness and dissatisfaction of consumers and patients because of their experience
that access is so problematic within the plans. The question now is
not whether to manage care but how to manage it more effectively
and more in the interest of patients.
The trend toward entrusting patients to organizations that
accept business and insurance risk and are accountable for value as
well as other aspects of service delivery seems unlikely to abate:
private employer-based plans will continue to create a market for
health plan management, and it seems likely that government
programs will increase their effort to transform their directlyadministered fee-for-service programs into programs with private
risk-bearing delivery systems, creating a continuing need for
reliable public-private partnerships. The critical task for public
policy, therefore, particularly in light of what has happened in the
current HMO experiment, is to make certain that the private
sector has the ability to organize itself in a way that makes it
serviceable to the widest range of private customers, a fit custodian
of the public interest in its own right, and a competent and
trustworthy partner for government. This objective implies a larger
role for employer-based health plans and nonprofit organizations,
and a smaller one for commercial insurance and insurer-provider
integrated organizations than previously assumed in health policy
analysis.

INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES, ETHICS

The argument of this Introduction is that
for consumers and patients to wish to receive
through organizations that are committed
them, the legal infrastructure for the health
to be designed in such a way that the types

because it is rational
their medical services
and accountable to
services sector ought
of organizations that
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have built the health services sector will be able to serve as the
foundation for the new medical economy.
The importance of enabling these institution to continue to
function transcends the question whether the financing of health
care ought to be mainly a governmental function: even a national
health insurance system will need competent, reliable, trustworthy
private sector partners to handle major aspects of service delivery
and to mediate conflict. Nonprofit institutions and employer-based
health benefit plans can do this work without presenting fundamental issues of legitimacy because they are already part of the
governance structure, representing the capacity for private voluntary action that makes it possible in the United States for people to
undertake collective action to solve collective problems without
building the state. Advocates of managed care have hoped that
governance functions might be submerged and obscured by being
transformed into market relationships in a commercialized health
sector; but that effort has not gone as well as expected and we are
now confronted with the need to face up to the governance issues
and to nurture organizations that can contain them. The employer-based health benefit plans and the nonprofit medical care
organizations have all along been performing governance as well as
service delivery functions; it would be perverse to destroy this capability just when it is needed most urgently.
To say this is not to suggest that commercial entrepreneurial enterprises are somehow intrinsically deficient. To observe that their
managers' duties, fiduciary in nature, lie in a direction different
from the duties of health care professionals with clinical responsibility for patients is to state a fact, not to make an accusation.
Corporate commitment to maximizing value for shareholders is
not a moral failing but simply an aspect of the structure of forprofit enterprises that provides assurance to those who invest in
them. Without this assurance and investment the level of economic
activity would be a good deal lower and the society less prosperous.
The dominance of these types of businesses in the managed care
industry threatens, however, to bring into the health care world
not only the energy and initiative of private organizations but also
the value structure of the commercial world. There is no reason to
believe that commercial organizations calibrate their devotion to
shareholder interest inversely to the degree of vulnerability of the
clientele they serve, while the duty to put self and self-interest aside
in order to serve patients and clients is the essence of professional
responsibility. The present travail of the health care sector is that
commercialized managed care has suddenly come to dominance
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within a structure of health care markets and regulation that were
built in a time when fee-for-service coverage, nonprofit organization,
and full-bore professionalism were the norms. The lack of fit between the old legal regime and the new entities and practices
governed by it has given rise to a demand for aggressive managed
care regulation.
The rhetoric being deployed in the drive to regulate managed
care is, however, plagued by at least as much confusion about what
kinds of entities populate the health care sector as is the discourse
of health policy. Managed care has elicited a stylized assertion that
"managed care reform" is necessary because "HMOs" are making
"profits" on "denying care to patients," thus implicitly conflating
managed care with HMOs and HMOs with for-profit enterprise.
This rhetoric is an impediment to clear thinking. It is true that
publicly-traded commercial companies that combine insurer and
provider functions are more prominent in the health care industry
than is arguably in the public interest; but managed care itself is
here to stay and the organizations that provide it can be customer-led or nonprofit and need not take insurance risk.
Moreover, even at present a good deal of "managed care" is being provided by employers as direct procurement from providers
or through third-party administrators that are their agents. It
stretches the term to think of the officers of, for example, the
Ford Motor Company, as a "managed care organization," or, even
more implausibly, as an "HMO," but all the organizations arranging for medical care for patients tend to be swept up in the same
rubric that feeds into the political shorthand. Different types of
organizations tend to behave differently, even when they are all
managing care.
Confusion about what the entities are that arguably need to be
regulated stems in part from the experience of the past few years
in which the public discovered that the nonprofit organizations on
which they have relied for care or coverage have been or are in the
process of being displaced or commanded by presumptively lesstrustworthy commercial insurers or HMOs, at the same time that
they are being asked to negotiate the transition to managed care.
Theory has long taught that any insurance organization that accepts a risk-based premium payment in advance of the obligation
to pay claims and then charges off claims expenses against premium income will have an interest in avoiding or at least delaying
paying even legitimate claims. Following the same principle, capitated payment to a provider creates incentives, perhaps
undetectable by patients, to under-treat. There is thus reason to
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worry about all premium- or capitation-financed arrangements,
and special reason to worry where the incentives to opportunistic
behavior created by insurance-type risk arrangements are not
counteracted by professional or institutional commitment to the
provision of high-quality medical service. Thus from the point of
view of the patient or consumer the for-profit integrated insurer/provider enterprise is the most dangerous form of
integrated medical services organization because it marries the risk
of opportunism intrinsic to insurance coverage with the information imbalance characteristic of medical practice and suffuses the
entire arrangement with profit motive. Consumers and patients are
reporting experiences with the practice of managed care that confirm the theory of it, namely that the behaviors of integrated
insurer-provider organizations may threaten the medical interests
of the patients.
As a practical matter, however, it seems likely that in the new
medical economy care will be provided through organizations that
will link coverage and provider functions: the challenge is to find
techniques of realizing the potential of such arrangements for
medical and economic efficiency while mitigating their negative
effects. Given the inherent dangerousness of premium- or capitation-financed arrangements for health care delivery, and indeed of
all arrangements that allow providers to profit on the difference
between revenues and costs where costs may be controlled by declining to render or by postponing medically useful service to
patients, it is especially important that financing and service delivery be handled by organizations whose incentives are aligned very
basically with those of the patients. This can be accomplished to
some degree through entrusting the supply functions to professionals and nonprofit organizations, as is the tradition, but those
craft-minded suppliers have already demonstrated their propensity
to believe that higher quality from their point of view is always the
higher good from the patient's point of view, which is not the case.
Even the most professionally trustworthy service provider still operates within the essentially adversarial relationship between seller
and buyer, wherein a seller prospers by inducing the buyer to buy
what is most advantageous for the seller to sell, regardless of
buyer's own best interests. The provider's duty to respect the patient's best interest as the patient believes it to be has been
imposed by the law in the doctrine of informed consent; even so
the provider is required only to inform the patient of the patient's
medical options at the time when the treatment for which consent
is sought is to be administered.
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Integrated medical service arrangements, by contrast, aim to
have the patient consider and express his or her general, including
economic, interests at an earlier point in time, a point at which the
patient is not yet a patient but only a consumer of an insurance
package. As idealized by health policy experts, insurer/provider
integration enables the consumer at the time of buying a health
plan to decide on a price that he or she is willing to pay for all the
medical services covered by the plan under all the circumstances in
which they might be necessary, and to decide on the style of care,
including restraints on utilization, to which the persons covered
under the contract of coverage will be bound. 4 A person who buys
a managed care plan therefore agrees to a rationing scheme to be
applied to his or her future self, as well as the present and future
selves of others covered by the contract. This act of rationing tends
to be more drastic than ordinary advance purchases, because patients typically cannot afford major health care expenses at time of
service, which is why they buy coverage in the first place. When
coverage for medically useful care is not available because of a contract limitation, that care is generally foregone and is most likely to
be foregone where the care is very expensive. A person buying a
managed care contract thus takes an elaborate set of risks.
First is the risk that the buyer will not be able to tell at the time
of entering into the contract what is actually promised by way of
medical service. Because contracts for health coverage are agreements for the provision of custom medical services, the customer
buys a combination of treatment capability and clinical judgment
process, culminating perhaps in an intervention. Although the
contract will say in general that, for example, "inpatient and outpatient services" are "covered," almost as though inpatient and
outpatient care were commodities, the coverage is actually for inpatient and outpatient services that are medically indicated in the
particular circumstances in which the patient seeks medical assistance. The care that a patient receives under the contract results
from the deployment of capability pursuant to the exercise of
clinical medical judgment. Traditional, familiar indemnity-style
coverage contracts, by not specifying any other procedure, allowed
the patient to select the provider, and promised to pay for whatever treatment recommendations resulted from the provider's own
medical decisionmaking process, not influenced by the insurer.
Insurance organizations engaging in managed care now frequently
14.
Professors Morreim and Hall both take this view; Professor Morreim suggests some
techniques for making the restraints more articulate and enforceable. See Hall, supra note 8;
Morriem, supra note 4.
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restrict choice of provider and treatment, often without alerting
buyers to the restrictions or providing information as to how these
restrictions are imposed. Managed care organizations also frequently provide financial incentives to providers to restrict the
amount of care given, also without informing the buyers about the
restrictions. The buyer is therefore placed in a position in which
elements of the contractual bargain that are material to the definition of the insurer's obligation, and which the insurer intends to
use to limit an otherwise open-ended duty to furnish or pay for
medical services, are kept secret by the insurer. Persons buying
managed care contracts are therefore vulnerable to nasty surprises
when they require medical care. The theoretical argument that
managed care can introduce a tendency toward efficiency into
medical markets because it allows consumers to make quality/price
tradeoffs collapses if the consumers cannot tell what they are buying. All models of efficient markets assume perfect information on
the part of buyers and sellers: so far from curing this problem
managed care aggravates it by increasing the uncertainty as to the
content of the insurer's promise. The uncertainty deprives the
consumer and patient of value in unpredictable ways: the inpredictability is itself a cost. Specification of clinical guidelines and
constraints is a useful partial corrective, but is best coupled with
trustworthiness on the part of clinicians.
Second is the risk that the company may behave opportunistically with respect to performing under the contract on matters that
involve plan administration, such as paying claims legitimately presented or approving or exploring the benefits of a particular
course of treatment. Especially in gatekeeper models, limiting referrals for specialty assessment is the governor on utilization,
making it unusual for a claim to be created or presented for a service that the company is unwilling to supply. Coupled with the
essential indeterminacy of the company's promise, discussed
above, opportunism is a major risk in managed care contract administration. A variant on this problem is that insurers seeking to
please and attract low-risk customers may be relatively generous
with inexpensive services while being reluctant to provide care to
patients who become seriously ill. Patients who respond to plan
marketing of attractive benefits may discover to their sorrow that
when they become ill their insurer can think only of how to discard
them.
Third is the risk that the plan might seek to influence providers
to exercise their medical judgment in the interests of the plan
rather than of the patients, or that the providers might allow their
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medical advice to be influenced by their own economic interest in
maintaining their relationship with the company, or that, where
the patient is required to use providers of the plan's own choosing,
the plan will choose only less-qualified or more-docile providers.
These are among the much-discussed inherent risks of any sort of
third-party payment arrangement that is not unlimited indemnity
insurance; however, the hazards in commercial insurer-provider
organizations are very considerable and contribute to the uncertainty that the customer faces in making a contract, since the
customer cannot be certain that the medical advice promised in
the contract will be medical advice informed by ordinary professional standards and rendered with an exclusive consideration of
her own interests. If the consumer cannot find out the ways in
which the company seeks to influence the providers she cannot
decide what technique to use to discount the medical advice for
the possibility of insurer influence, thereby contributing to uncertainty and therefore to her cost.
Fourth is the risk that the consumer will buy the wrong insurance product because the consumer is mistaken in some crucial
respect as to what medical situations are likely to arise and what
care will need to be provided. This is a very large problem in contracting for insurance, since it is well-known that individuals
substantially mis-estimate risks and miscalculate the likely consequences of assuming risk. It is exacerbated when the consumer
cannot tell what is actually likely to be provided under the contract
of coverage.
Fifth is the risk that, in the event of a difference between the
care covered and the care needed the patient will be unable financially to make up the shortfall. The irony of health insurance is
that people require it most at its most expensive, but health insurers have an incentive-to attempt to save money for the company on
precisely those services.
These are enormous risks, and they are risks against which it is
rational for consumers to seek legal and regulatory protection.
Common law and regulation have traditionally imposed heightened legal duties on medical professionals and insurers. Insurance
regulation has been mobilized to make certain that health insurance packages are not designed in ways that take advantage of
laypersons' propensity to make mistakes in characterizing and estimating medical risk, or their inability to bargain for the coverage
they might desire, insurance contracts being contracts of adhesion;
and the common law imposes on insurers a legal duty to perform
contract administration in good faith and encourages clarity in
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drafting by construing insurance contracts against the drafter. The
law governing medical care requires providers to give care that is
within the professional standard of care regardless of the business
relationship between provider and patient.
These are, however, rules for the old fee-for-service economy of
medical care in which professionalism was a dominant value. They
and others that might be invented to redress injuries retrospectively do not furnish sufficient protection when the entity subject
to them is part of an integration of insurer and provider: the capitated payment technique aggravates unmanageably all of the
problems of information and agency that inhere in insurance and
professional services contracts and produces irresistible incentives
for opportunistic behavior. From the patient's point of view, the
ability to sue or to call a regulatory agency is no substitute for adequate performance willingly rendered. The implication is clear:
where underlying arrangements allow predation the customer's
best protection lies in the character and trustworthiness of the persons with whom he or she is dealing and their own structural
imperative to be responsive to the interests of their customers.
Economic theory thus teaches that persons who must receive medical care through organizations may rationally prefer to deal with
entities whose structure and personnel convey an implicit assurance
of trustworthiness because of intrinsic commitment. In health care
in particular it may be wholly rational as an economic matter, taking
into account the stakes, to prefer, e.g., an organization managed by a
faith-based institution or a community-supported one or one associated with an academic medical center to one that is driven by the
imperatives of the commercial marketplace and the equity markets.
Patients may prefer indemnity-style health coverage to managed care
mainly because they are not paying the full cost; but they may
rationally prefer nonprofit to for-profit health care firms for reasons
grounded solidly in considerations of value, and perhaps of values as
well.
It will come as no surprise, then, that managed care, which in
order to succeed in the marketplace needs to carry badges of
trustworthiness, is not at all the child of commercial entrepreneurship but rather was pioneered, like other forms of health
coverage, by nonprofits, professionals, and employers. The first
generation of managed care was created by employer-, provider- or
community-based organizations such as Kaiser Permanente, the
Roos-Loss Clinic, and the Group Health Cooperative of Puget
Sound. These organizations were created out of enthusiasm for
conscious collaboration among patients and providers: providers
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were to assume responsibility for the health of the patients rather
than pursuing opportunities in the economy of fee-for-service
practice, and patients were collectively to take responsibility for the
financial security of the providers by employing them on salary or
contract. Part of the strategy of these organizations was to maintain
the health of the patients through preventive and primary care in
order to obviate avoidable medical expenditures. The classic
"group health plan," as these arrangements were called, was
therefore an ethical compact between and among providers and
patients to try to achieve something approaching medical and
economic efficiency and self-governance through the voluntary
form of organization. Organizational constraints on tie
consumption of services by the individual members could be
regarded as collective allocation of collective resources through
governance rather than market processes. Medical efficiency was to
be achieved through functional and clinical integration; all of
these forms of integration, including economic integration, would
allow for close communication among practitioners and therefore
better patient care. The original flavor of the organizations is
captured in the fact that patients were said to 'join" HMOs, to
"belong to" them, rather than being "covered by" them, in a
language that suggests governance rather than business
relationships. Some of these group health plans were organized as
customer-led cooperatives.
These earliest group health plans might usefully be regarded as
"idea-driven," because the inspiration for their creation came from
physicians, patients, and employers who were searching for ways to
improve the medical care available to patients and communities in
which they had a stake. The organizations themselves tended to be
local and somewhat small relative to the total marketplace, which
was dominated by the indemnity fee-for-service Blue Cross and
commercial insurance plans. Because the delivery of service in the
group health plans was strongly differentiated from fee-for-service
practice and its cost to the patients not significantly lower, the
plans appealed to persons who preferred the style of practice.
The idea-driven managed care organizations were detested by
organized medicine. In part because the physicians were seen as
being insufficiently interested in the economic rewards of private
fee-for-service practice, rewards that were thought to stimulate a
pursuit of excellence, physicians affiliated with them were persecuted by their mainstream colleagues. The group health plans thus
began an ideological conflict within the medical profession in
which the plans were on the political left, associated with unions
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and the cooperative movement, while organized medicine, associated with private entrepreneurial practice, was on the political
right. It is these first-generation managed care organizations,
greatly valorized by public health experts, that have furnished the
basis for the enthusiasm for HMOs in orthodox public health circles.
How this enthusiasm for community-based HMOs morphed into
an enthusiasm for for-profit HMOs is a story about the nonprofit
hospitals' search for ways to compete on price as costreimbursement declined as a technique of provider payment. The
story needs telling here because it points to the juncture at which
policy seems to have gone wrong: legal constraints on nonprofit
hospitals' ability to raise outside risk capital or to make large profits on commercial activity prevented the nonprofits from growing
provider-led organizations to meet the emerging demand for managed care. In the critical period of the early 1990s it was the
commercial insurers, armed with vast reserves and access to financial markets, that developed the managed care industry. The
collapse of the industry thus created and public uneasiness with
the dominance of commercial enterprise in managed care suggest
that it is appropriate to re-think some of these limitations on the
ability of nonprofit institutions to raise risk capital. Insofar as the
failure of managed care can be thought of as a consequence of a
mismatch between the tasks to be done and the types of organizations that fortuitously had the wherewithal to undertake them, the
failure of managed care might be thought of as a consequence of
correctable failings of the underlying law of nonprofit organizations. The prospects for managed care may appear somewhat less
discouraging in this light.
HospitalStrategies in the 1980s
All throughout the postwar period of the growth of modern
medicine the nonprofit hospitals were aligned mainly with
organized medicine and against the group health plans. The HMO
form of organization did not move into the medical mainstream
until the 1980s when respectable nonprofit hospitals created
HMOs as cost-containment devices in order to compete in a
marketplace becoming more price-sensitive, in which government
payments were falling and the tide of hospital regulation rising and
the need to acquire privately-insured patients more urgent. This
development in practice had followed, and was facilitated by a
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development in theory. In the 1970s, economists had concluded
that the rate of price inflation in the medical services sector could
be brought down only if the underlying organizational structure
were rationalized. They therefore promoted economic integration
as the vehicle for achieving efficiency and enabling vigorous price
competition. At the same time, the antitrust onslaught began
against anti-competitive economic arrangements that were
enforced as part of collective professional self-governance. After
the American Medical Association's competition-discouraging
professional ethics were abandoned as a result of Federal Trade
Commission enforcement action, physicians could no longer
legally resist by collective action the movement toward
rationalization and integration. They consequently found
themselves involved in the hospitals' attempts to create new
organizations intended to align physicians' interests more closely
with those of hospitals.
Nonprofit organizations are not treated differently from forprofit ones for purposes of antitrust analysis, so as antitrust scrutiny
intensified nonprofit hospitals found their market behaviors being
evaluated under the same standards applied to other industries.
Hospital planning through private agreements became illegal and
state certificate-of-need regulation a less-certain shield against antitrust liability, 15 and individual hospitals were turned loose to
compete on price. Faced with the need to survive in the new marketplace, during the 1980s numerous nonprofit hospitals
reorganized to create complex corporate structures in which a family of related organizations centered on a hospital might include,
for example, a physician-hospital organization and a licensed HMO
deployed in the marketplace to allow the taking of insurance risk.
Unless they themselves owned hospitals, as did some of the older
idea-driven integrated organizations, these provider-sponsored
HMOs were typically for-profit corporations owned by the hospital
or its holding company. A holding company for a nonprofit hospital might own a for-profit medical equipment company or a home
health agency or other profit-making ventures as well. The forprofit satellite organizations fed the nonprofit mother institution,
which remained a charity. Much of the urgency in these arrangements was stimulated by the adoption for Medicare cost
reimbursement of the Diagnosis Related Grouping payment methodology, the effect of which was to increase substantially the
business risk involved in being a provider and to make it advanta-

15.

Professor Hammer sets out this history. See Hammer, supra note 12, at 732-38.
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geous to move into separate entities a hospital's potentially profitable activities.
The line between nonprofit and for-profit blurred. Nonprofit
hospitals, through their affiliated HMOs, were competing head to
head with regulated insurers and HMOs. Physicians on hospital
medical staffs organized and joined profit-making entities that contracted for them with health plans, distributed economic incentives
for controlling utilization, and assumed and passed through to
them business risk. Regardless of whether all of this activity had any
significant effect on medical cost inflation, it had a tremendous
influence on thinking about medical care organization. For the
first time, health care providers were taking business risk; some
were even taking insurance risk. This was forward integration of
providers into the insurance function, not unlike the idea-driven
group health plans; but these moves were being made to enable
hospitals to compete in the market of corporate health benefits
purchasing, no,, to serve self-governing communities of patients.
Far from being idealistic, these arrangements were predicated on
the conviction that mutual financial risk provides incentives for
prudence in resource consumption and stimulates innovation for
the sake of achieving efficiencies. Conventional economic thinking
had arrived in the nonprofit health care industry.
If creating an integrated organization in order to compete in the
market was the objective, however, it was not clear that nonprofit
hospitals were best suited to be the integrators: what a nonprofit
hospital could do by creating a thinly-capitalized for-profit subsidiary, an insurance company could do more easily by creating a
richly-capitalized one. Moreover, because non-provider-based
companies are neither tied to investments in bricks and mortar nor
encumbered by legally mandated ongoing relationships with medical staffs they are more free than are hospital-based HMOs to select
their participating providers with an eye on market demand and
the presumed dictates of efficiency. A hospital might as a practical
matter have to include all of its specialist physicians in its HMO,
while a non-hospital-based HMO can be selective and therefore
obtain a cost advantage. More importantly, a commercial for-profit
company has access to capital that is provided to it explicitly for the
purpose of allowing it to take business and insurance risk, while
nonprofits must use capital acquired by debt financing, charitable
contributions, or operating reserves.
Hospital-based HMOs struggled throughout the 1980s to compete with commercial insurers in the emerging managed care
marketplace. By the time the Clintons proposed their massive,
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HMO-based restructuring of the health care sector, it was already
apparent that commercial for-profit HMOs would be major forces
in the proposed government-supervised markets should the Clinton Plan be adopted. Indeed the germ of the design for the
Clinton Plan had been proposed by the Jackson Hole Group, an
informal convocation of health policy experts and insurance company executives. During the pendency of the Clinton Plan several
major insurers, as well as other for-profit enterprises, invested large
sums in creating the networks that, after the Clinton Plan failed,
would be the foundations of their HMOs and other managed care
products. Nonprofits joined in this effort to scale up, but the lack
of access to risk capital has been a crippling constraint on their
ability to compete in the construction of large networks covering
markets throughout a region or across the country. For all of these
reasons, the major firms in the new managed care industry have
not been provider-based or provider-sponsored. The largest are
for-profit commercial insurance carriers and HMOs.
New Usesfor Old Solutions: The Customer-Sponsored Organization

And so we arrive at our current situation, with commercial, forprofit, even publicly-traded organizations suddenly having
emerged to dominate the health care industry. The fact that capital can flow so suddenly toward apparent opportunity is a strength
of the economy and a credit to the legal infrastructure that supports commercial business; but where commercialism itself is
problematic care should be taken not to allow the superior capital
resources of entrepreneurial enterprise to result in the elimination
of institutions that are more reliable servants of the common interest. Entrepreneurial capitalism did not build the health care sector
and arguably cannot sustain it. There is a large difference between
practicing or arranging for good medicine because good medicine
is good "customer service," and practicing or arranging for good
medicine because one is required to do so because of professional
norms, fiduciary duties, and institutional identity. Protection for
the patient and guarantees of service to the common good have
historically lain in the medical profession's assumption of positive
duty and in the commitment of voluntary medical care organizations to patient care and community service, not in anything so
fragile as commercial organizations' self-interest in achieving high
levels of "consumer satisfaction," whatever that may mean in a
market so shaped by imbalances of information and imperfections
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of agency. In medical markets, consequently, because of customer
demand for quality and trustworthiness, professional and institutional virtue count as economic value that it ought to be the
objective of public policy to build.
This train of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the turn toward publicly-held for-profit corporations that combine insurer
and provider functions is a mistake from all points of view. Their
largely adversarial relationships with providers make it difficult for
them to command the allegiance of health care knowledge professionals that might make possible the continuous stream of
innovation and improvement that they require in order to achieve
genuine long-term gains in efficiency and productivity. If they do
business with Medicare and Medicaid they are vulnerable to
changes in public policy and financing that force them to flee,
which many of them have done. If they do business with private
employers they face customers whose organizing principles and
fundamental interests in risk pooling and coverage are not consistent with their own and that will not tolerate their making large
profits on assuming and managing risk. The upshot of all of these
structural difficulties is that commercial managed care seems to be
unable to bring to the health care industry the efficiency and productivity gains that were to have been its principal contribution;
and the tension between the business imperatives of the managed
care organizations and the needs of their institutional customers
has made them behave in ways that have generated uncertainty,
unreliability and turbulence. It bears emphasizing that the cost of
much of this failure has been borne by those who risked their own
capital in pursuit of the expectations raised by the theories propounded by health policy experts. The failure in practice of this
generation of managed care has to be understood as a failure also
of theory.
The issue is how to satisfy that demand for quality and
trustworthiness without resurrecting fee-for-service medicine. The
move away from fee-for-service practice nonetheless seems
irreversible, and health care delivery through organizations
inevitable, irresistible. If commercial managed care organizations
are not the answer, where might we turn? The argument of this
Introduction is that, barring some unlikely upsurge of legislative
enthusiasm for government management, the American health
care sector cannot be operated except through nonprofit and
employer-based organizations of the type that historically have
been responsible for it. The question with which we began this
section was "what types of entities are best suited to be part of
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public-private partnerships to provide essential medical services?"
The answer is that for structural reasons some of the most
attractive entities are employer-based health benefit plans and
nonprofit medical care organizations, that is, that we ought to want
what we have, with some improvements.
Before pursuing this idea further, let us reflect briefly on the
implications of the history just presented and the arguments just
made. The critical starting point for understanding medical markets is that fee-for-service practice as we know it, while certainly
familiar, and venerable enough to be considered traditional, is not
the natural state of the economy of medical practice in a modern
industrial economy based on large organizations. As noted earlier,
some medical practitioners can be expected to try to escape artisanal fee-for-service practice by seeking the patronage of clients
that can provide the capital to move the practitioners from a need
to generate revenue through ad hoc patient contacts paid for on a
fee-for-service basis to stable relationships that provide continuity
of financial support and a patient base. Large organizations will
tend to employ physicians to serve their clientele, which may be
workers or customers; and where there is a possibility of expanding
demand they will furnish the capital to construct multi-practitioner
medical care organizations that can develop the market for medical service. These organizations can provide the capital to move the
practitioners from a need to generate revenue through ad hoc patient contacts paid for on a fee-for-service basis to stable
relationships that provide continuity of financial support and a
patient base. Such a multi-practitioner organization may be internal to another organization and may serve its clientele (as, for
example, the medical unit of a military or industrial or educational
organization) or may seek a wider clientele, as does a university
medical center. The connections of the multi-practitioner organization with the source of its capital may be tight or loose: the
organization may be an internal unit; or it may be independent
and under the governance of others, who may be the physicians,
the patients, investor-owners, or other entities. There are many options.
All other things being equal, because of the risks to patients of
obtaining medical service through organizations rather than directly from individual providers whose primary duty is to the
patients, it is rational for them to prefer organizations in which
their interests are represented in the governance structure itself, or
organizations led by providers whose interests are aligned structurally with their own, insofar as that can be achieved. Indeed, this
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preference was expressed in the creation of the older, idea-driven
group health plans, just as the present revolt against commercial
managed care reflects some patient distrust of profit-making firms
in the role of integrated medical service organization. How the
health care industry as a whole would have been configured if the
nonprofit idea-driven integrated organizations had not been discouraged systematically by organized medicine is difficult to tell.
The popularity of these nonprofits with patients suggests that there
might have been room in the market for more of their type, assuming that capital could have been found to enable their formation.
Because idea-driven nonprofit managed care organization did
not have an adequate test in the mainstream markets, however, we
do not know what particular styles of medical care delivery might
have been developed under the guidance of provider- or consumer-sponsored boards in an industry less shaped by the culture
of fee-for-service practice. Theory teaches, at the very least, that (a)
customers are likely to suffer less from opportunistic behaviors on
the part of management where the customers own the enterprise
itself and are the governing body to which management must report (assuming that management does not succeed in corrupting
this relationship); (b) customer-led organizations can design their
own products and services to respond to the preferences of the
customer-members as expressed directly and complexly through
their voice in the organizations as well as silently and inferentially
by their behaviors as consumers; and (c) customer-led organizations can rectify many information deficits on the part of patients
by supplying the resources necessary to educate their clientele, including some deficits that lead to provider-patient information
asymmetries. A customer-led organization is also in a position to
provide internal dispute resolution processes that may be responsible and responsive complements to civil liabilities. I do not mean
to suggest that every customer-led organization will display these
virtues immediately upon its creation, simply that the powers and
incentives just mentioned inhere in the form itself.
There are very few customer-led organizations in the business of
delivering medical services, but there are thousands of such organizations presently performing the work of organizing risk pools
and negotiating for coverage or directly for services. These are the
employer-based employee health benefit plans: the plan sponsors
are ipso facto customers because they buy medical services for distribution to the participants in and beneficiaries of their plans;
from the point of view of the employees, the plan sponsors can be
considered (imperfect) agents of the employees for purposes of
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arranging for coverage or care. In principle, every employer-based
plan could be converted into a free-standing organization with
power to manage the assets devoted to the purchase of health
benefits. Such an organization could include representation of
plan participants and beneficiaries in the governing body, could be
multi-employer for the purpose of achieving efficient size for risk
pooling, could hire its own administrators, and, if of appropriate
size and if backed by guaranty, stop-loss, and reinsurance arrangements, could be self-funded just as the employer-sponsored plans
are now. Examples of such customer-led multi-employer organizations are TIAA-CREF, presently operating in the pension area, and
the numerous Taft-Hartley plans, which are governed jointly by
labor and management. I do not suggest that either of these models could be used unmodified for employee health plans, only that
the idea of the customer-led employee pension or welfare benefit
plan is not novel. The line between an employer-based health
benefit plan and an employees' mutual insurer is in principle quite
thin, and the one can be made into something approximating the
other with only modest changes in structure and funding. There is,
in short, already a record of successful operation of organizations of
a type that can overcome the more glaring imperfections of integrated insurer-provider organizations. Customer-led organizations
would create governance problems, and adverse selection would
have to be combated; but only the most determined pessimist
would believe that nothing can be designed that would be preferable to commercial HMOs as the backbone of the American health
care system. With these thoughts in mind, let us take a longer look
at the employer-based health benefit system.

HEALTH COVERAGE WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE:
THE STRUCTURE OF THE EMPLOYER-BASED SYSTEM
OF EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFITS

Nothing in the health care sector operates quite the way it works
in the ordinary commercial marketplace, least of all the system of
risk pooling. Despite the virtually universal perception that what
patients have or ought to have is "private health insurance," and
the popular misapprehension that the unit of coverage is the individual, the fact is that private insurance companies did not develop
the market for health coverage and have never been able to create
stable arrangements for individual coverage. Health insurance as
we know it is a group product and is the fruit of the collaboration
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between nonprofit hospitals and large employers. It began as hospitalization insurance invented by a university hospital and sold to a
teachers' organization. In the 1940s and 1950s the market for coverage was developed nationwide by the nonprofit hospitals and
their captive nonprofit insurer, the Blue Cross plans. Commercial
insurers came late and marginally to health care markets, as creamskimmers, offering low rates to actuarially attractive customers, frequently using health insurance as a loss-leader for the more
lucrative business of selling life and disability insurance. To look to
commercial insurance as having established norms by which successful markets in health insurance function is to adopt a mistaken
view of this history: coverage has in fact been supplied by or
through large private employers that are in no sense insurance carriers.
The role of employers in health coverage is the subject of much
confusion. They are, to repeat, not in the business of insurance.
For them, providing coverage is not an opportunity to profit but
rather a cost associated with maintaining a workforce, expressed
under present practices as an aspect of employee compensation. If
employers' powers are not constrained by regulation, provider
collusion, or collective bargaining agreements, employers have the
same power that, for example, military or sports organizations have
to decide whether, in what quantity and quality, and by what
techniques, to supply medical services to their employees. They can
hire medical personnel and build hospitals and clinics, as Kaiser
Engineers did in creating the medical care organization that
became Kaiser Permanente. Employers may administer their
medical program with their own personnel or may decide as a
matter of convenience, as in any other "make or buy" decision, to
employ outside contractors to run medical programs for them.
This is the null state, the condition that would exist in the absence
of defensive collective action by providers or regulation by
government. Physicians have consequently feared employer-based
coverage, as they have feared government health programs,
because large organizations that have a responsibility to provide
medical services to substantial populations have the capital to build
integrated medical care organizations or to create a market for
them: the AMA's prohibitions on "contract practice" and
"corporate practice" were aimed at physicians who might find it
attractive to work for employers or for integrated medical
organizations. For decades professional ethics that were enforced
by drastic penalties against offending physicians inhibited any but
fee-for-service practice. Physicians have supported indemnity
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insurance very strongly. Consequently, most employers until
relatively recently have outsourced their provision of health
benefits through the purchase of insurance from regulated
carriers, including Blue Cross plans.
This technique of providing employee health benefits coverage
through the purchase of insurance or the Blue Cross "service benefit" plans has created the impression that the basic nature of what
was being provided was itself "insurance," the unit of coverage the
individual, the group simply a vehicle for obtaining a kind of volume discount, and the employer a source of administrative
support. Large employers have been able to create the market for
group health coverage, however, precisely because they perform
the essential insurance function of creating the groups within
which risk is pooled but themselves do not behave like insurers. Let
us take up these points in reverse order. What distinguishes an
employer from an insurer is the complex nature of the employment relationship of which health coverage is part, as compared to
the simple nature of the insurance relationship of which health
coverage, if sold as a separate product, is the whole. Insurers must
engage in risk selection in order to avoid having to pay claims that
exceed the amount of revenue attributable to the insured persons
who incur the claims; given the opportunity insurers will attempt to
break off relationships with customers whose claims seem likely to
exceed the income they generate. An employer, by contrast, evaluates employees in the context of the totality of their contribution
to the employer's enterprise judged against their compensation, of
which their health benefit cost is a component. This style of evaluation produces personnel decisions based on principles different
from those used in insurance underwriting, with the consequence
that employers may tend to keep in their employment groups persons who might not be regarded as good customers by insurers
offering coverage in an individual market. The larger the employer, the greater the opportunity to submerge the health care
costs of high-risk employees in the general flow of revenues and
expenses. Many high-risk persons have health coverage only because they belong to large employer-based groups that provide or
obtain coverage for everyone in the group.
This matters. Although risk selection and adverse selection operate in employer-based groups they must be mediated through
the personnel process and, therefore, proceed at paces that are
much slower than insurance underwriting cycles, making employee
groups relatively stable from an underwriting point of view. The
key to this stability is that in order to engage in risk selection the
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employer must make a large, complicated decision to hire or fire
an individual instead of a small, uncomplicated decision to offer
coverage or not; in order to engage in adverse selection (meaning,
in this non-insurance context, to have an undisclosed intention to
incur medical costs in excess of imputed contributions to the
common fund available for employee health benefits) a person
must succeed in being hired. The complexity of the personnel decision makes entry into and exit from an employer-based group
relatively difficult, leading to stability in its composition. This stability, when coupled with large size and the ability of the plan sponsor
to reduce administrative costs by making a single contract covering
all the subscribers within the group, makes the pre-formed large
employment group an attractive customer for a health insurer. Another way to say this is that the large groups transfer to their
insurance arrangements their own stability. For other customers,
health insurance markets are inherently unstable.
There are really three segments to the health insurance market:
those groups large and stable enough to take advantage of the law
of large numbers and stop-loss or reinsurance in estimating likely
medical costs, self-funding their health benefit programs and those
groups that are inherently risky as an actuarial matter, regardless of
the health status of their members at any particular time, because
they are too small to buy stop-loss or reinsurance to protect against
excess risk; and individuals. Most large- and medium-sized employers self-fund their employee health benefit programs, leaving
mainly smaller groups and individuals in the markets served by
regulated insurance carriers. The insurance market that serves
small groups and individuals consequently has the dynamic of a
death spiral, resulting from the fact that a small group is likely at
some point to incur medical costs substantially in excess of the
premium revenue that it generates. Given the gap between premium income and risk, insurers search out and expel from their
books of business the highest-risk individuals and groups, and raise
rates to adjust to remaining high risk and cost. If all insurers engage in aggressive medical underwriting, very high risk groups and
individuals become uninsurable. Meanwhile, there is active competition for very low risk persons and groups, who have the benefit of
low rates as long as they have low claims experience. The remaining participants in the market have high average risk and pay high
average prices. In response to high cost, employers large enough to
self-fund their programs pull out of the insurance market. The insurers must engage in frequent underwriting of the customers who
are left in the market because all of these smaller groups are likely
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to have claims that exceed the premiums that can be collected
from them and even customers with favorable historical claims experience are risky because extremes tend to regress to the mean.
All groups therefore experience rate instability and have to pay
for the considerable administrative cost of the insurer. The cost of
insurance is consequently quite high, and the lowest-risk customers
are likely to flee the market because the insurance offered may not
seem to be a good value at the price demanded. The cycle repeats:
lower-risk customers flee, the highest are pushed out, the average
risk and cost rises, and the market shrinks at a higher price. The
higher the cost of the insurance the more the insurer needs to fear
"adverse selection," which is the likelihood that those most interested in purchasing coverage are those most likely to feel
themselves in need of medical care, since insurance may seem a
good value only to those who think themselves likely to use medical
services. All measures that tend to increase risks and costs for
insurers, even those undertaken in the name of "reform," therefore
tend to lead to premium increases that drive lower-risk and lowerincome customers out of the market. The individual and small-group
market tends therefore to be characterized by high prices, rate
instability, and uncertain availability of coverage. This dynamic is
compatible with aggressive competition for (temporarily) attractive
groups, so it is not uncommon for a small group to enjoy a relatively
low rate until, upon a group member becoming seriously ill, finding itself suddenly uninsurable. Sometimes the insurers withdraw
from the market, thereby reducing the availability of coverage. The
entire dynamic pushes low-income workers in small businesses into
Medicaid, if they qualify, or forces them to seek charity care. The
cost of this care is then passed back, incompletely, to the paying
customers of, or is taken as a loss by, the entities that provide the
uncompensated care. All of this contributes to the insolvency
threat faced by institutions that serve poor people, the unattractiveness of poorer areas for professional practices, and the general
rise in health care prices that must be paid by large employer-based
plans. Because employees of small businesses that cannot get access
to coverage in the commercial insurance market are, on average,
more likely to be women and more likely to be members of otherwise disadvantaged minorities than are employees of larger
employers, the problem of access to health coverage runs along
general lines of social inequality and segregation.
The problems of the small group insurance market, the inability
of insurance firms to avoid adverse selection and to create stable
large books of business across which to spread risk, affect everyone.
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The problems are endemic and intractable. They were masked as
long as large employers bought health benefits from regulated insurance companies and Blue Cross plans, because the large
employers contributed large, stable groups around which insurers
could build their books of business and therefore absorb riskier
smaller customers. When the large, and then medium-sized, employers withdrew into self-funding after authorized to do so by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, however, the
inherent dynamic of the remaining insurance market asserted itself
and the death spiral became manifest.
The question is what to do. The experience of the past halfcentury teaches that the only organizations that have ever been
able to provide stable coverage for American workers have actually
been the large employers; any solution likely to work must be designed to mimic their virtues. Those virtues include not only their
ability to amass large, stable groups but also their ability to align
their own coverage practices with the interests of the patients most
in need of medical care. This is not to suggest that employers' interests are perfectly aligned with those of their very sickest patients,
only that employers' interests are complex. Because they cover
many high-risk individuals the interests of the employer-based
plans complement, very generally, the interests of medical professionals in improving the state of the art in treating function- and
life-threatening diseases affecting their workforces, such as cardiovascular disease, cancer, and diabetes. This fact has historically
made them reliable partners in the development of American
medicine.
The great failing of the employer-based plans has been that,
historically, they have been relatively insensitive to price, creating
expectations and habits on the part of the medical profession and
the public that have made the plans' recent pursuit of cost control
through managed care jarring. The fault of profligacy having been
largely corrected in recent years, the employer-based plans remain
the entities in the system best suited to balance considerations of
cost and quality in order to achieve value for the customers. The
argument of this Introduction is that in light of the hazards of
trying to transform the health care system into one financed and
regulated by government but operated by commercial businesses,
we should look for a way to allow employer-based, customer-led
organizations to create a system of universal, portable coverage to
meet the needs of the emerging economy. This seems wholly
achievable as a matter of technique, but doing it will require a
good deal of private collective action and public-private
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partnership, and a commitment on the part of private
organizations to take on as collective self-regulation some of the
functions that might, in a wholly public system, be assumed by
government.
The private sector has done something like this before, in creating the Blue Cross, for many years the dominant institution in
health care finance around which employer-based coverage
formed itself. The Blue Cross is another of the hybrid, quasimarket institutions of the health care sector developed to enable
nonprofit organizations to develop extensive markets without having access to risk capital. Blue Cross organizations may perhaps
best be thought of as customer-led joint selling cooperatives
("service benefit" plans), owned by their participating nonprofit
hospitals and designed as financing mechanisms to increase and
stabilize hospitals' cash flow and to enable patients to ensure for
themselves access to hospital services at their time of medical need.
These motivations and practices contrast with those of commercial insurers, which must create value for shareholders, tend to
have an interest in restraining rather than encouraging the utilization of medical services in order to depress their loss ratios, and
have no intrinsic institutional interest in encouraging the provision
of medical care or the development of the medical arts. Although
commercial insurers have had to accommodate their behaviors to
health insurance markets historically shaped and dominated by the
Blue Cross plans, their intrinsic interests are irreducibly in conflict
with the interests of the patients most in need of medical services
and are therefore in conflict with core medical values.
The contrast between the commercial insurers and Blue Cross
plans should not, however, be overstated. What made the Blue
Cross plans work as risk-spreaders was not that they were nonprofits, nor that they were owned by their participating hospitals,
but rather the way in which they structured the markets. The
achievement of the Blue Cross plans was to diminish the operation
of ordinary insurance incentives by developing large group customers as risk-spreading entities in their own right, to spread risk
among such entities by the system of community rating, and to
provide guarantees of service to subscribers through hospitals'
promising service performance rather than through raising or accumulating large amounts of risk capital. In combination with
large employer-based coverage, the Blue Cross plans were, in a
word, ingenious in their ability to create a market for health insurance while sidestepping ordinary insurance market imperfections.
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Such ingenuity is required again. This time the task is to create
not just service but value for customers, to do so within markets
characterized by vigorous price competition, and to provide an institutional framework for private medical services delivery that
makes it practicable for governments to partner with reliable,
committed private organizations in the delivery of essential medical services. As with the original Blue Cross architecture, however,
it is necessary to design around the failures of insurance markets
and the intrinsic unsuitability of commercial insurance as the principal vehicle for health coverage. Before making some suggestions
for how to create coverage arrangements that would be more protective of customer interests, I would like to close this section with
some observations on the theory and practice of managed care as
we have come to know it for the past few years.
Health policy experts disapprove of the impulse to risk selection
on the part of insurers, and understand that insurance premiumtype techniques of financing medical services produce incentives to
under-treat, but otherwise find attractive insurers' interest in controlling claims experience and competing on price. The allure of
the integrated insurer-provider organization was its potential to
internalize the conflict between financial and service values in the
interest of constraining expenditures: in theory, if insurer and provider functions can be integrated economically then the insurance
and provider interests in the resulting organization should counteract each other and result in the organization's providing
medical services that represent the optimal relationship between
economic cost and medical benefit, which echoes the relationship
between the interest of a participant as a consumer interested in
economic value and as a patient interested in quality medical care.
Ideally, the insurer-provider conflict within an integrated organization should therefore be like the productive tension in other
industries between engineering and marketing, or between manufacturing and finance.
The flaw in this vision lies in the confusion between understanding economic theory and predicting business practice, manifested
in the tendency of HMO enthusiasts to assert or assume that any
insurer-provider organization necessarily as a consequence of its
intrinsic structure will achieve an appropriate balance between
medical values, i.e., providers' craft interests, and cost, i.e., insurers' financial interests, under conditions of price competition. In
reality, however, perfect balance is not an intrinsic attribute of the
integrated firm, emerging automatically upon integration. Rather,
accommodation between insurer and provider values is achieved, if
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at all, through internal bargaining local to the firm and has to be
arrived at by mutual adjustment among real people with different
interests, personalities, skills and cultures. An insurer-provider firm
dominated by providers can be expected to start with provider values and compromise toward insurer values, and vice versa. How far
the compromise must go will depend on how difficult it is to express and act upon any particular set of values within the firm
itself, and of course on the characteristics of the market that the
firm faces. The firm may get the balance wrong; it may not be able
to manage effectively; it may make mistakes; it may fail. It may also
exploit information asymmetries between it and its customers or
patients and may not be able to resist temptations to act opportunistically. What has caused the backlash against managed care is
not disagreement with abstract economic theory but outrage over
concrete business practices.
It is too soon to draw hard conclusions about the success or failure of managed care in general, or managed care plans in
particular, from the current backlash and economic turmoil, but at
the very least it has proven unrealistic to regard HMOs as the comprehensive solution to the problems of the health care sector,
inappropriate to talk of the insurer-provider firm as the ideal balancer of medical with cost considerations, and wrong to assume
that competent management springs up in automatic response to
financial incentives. The pervasive failure of managed care suggests
problems at its core, not simply particular failures on the part of
particular managers. The romance with managed care ought now
end. Strategies that are proposed in order to make the demand
side of the marketplace work in a way that will inspire acceptance
of commercial managed care, such as transforming employer-paid
insurance into an individual defined-contribution model and
eliminating tax preferences for employer contributions, would
tend to subject all health coverage to the failures of the individual
insurance market and would subject virtually all working Americans to a very significant tax increase. This seems a large step to
take in order to support a form of health care organization as
flawed as is the commercial insurer-provider firm. There must be a
better way.

MOVING FORWARD: REVIVALS AND INNOVATIONS

The direction of the argument of this Introduction is that the
private sector ought to be empowered to create medical financing
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and delivery vehicles that will be more closely aligned with the interests of the customers than are the commercial managed care
organizations that presently dominate the field. This argument
stems from the observation that customers may rationally prefer to
obtain their services through customer-led or provider-led organizations and that because of their intrinsic commitment to the
provision of health services these organizations are appropriate
partners for governments that have statutory or constitutional obligations to provide such benefits. If possible, therefore,
organizations of this type ought to be added to the mix of firms
operating in the health services industry. In this section I suggest
some directions for further thinking along these lines.
Business and customer cooperatives are hardly novel. I suspect
that imaginative lawyers and their clients would be able to devise
any number of governance structures to contain the private interests of the parties to cooperative arrangements of the type
suggested here. The more challenging problems surround the interface between private and public interest. Managed care was to
have been, or at least to have facilitated, the solution not just to
private but to systemic problems. Customer-led organizations look
promising, despite the effort required to create and use them, because they seem to have potential to help solve the systemic
problems: risk pooling, value for customers, medical efficiency,
economic efficiency and the relationship between markets and
governance in the health care sector.
Of these problems, the one that leaps out as most characteristic
of health coverage is that of risk pooling and its associated practices of risk selection and adverse selection. A full proposal for how
to approach this issue is beyond the scope of this Introduction, but
the solution is sufficiently within view that some design principles
can be offered. We know from the experience of employer selffunding that risk pooling can be handled at the reinsurance level
rather than at the primary insurance level: the risk of fairly small
groups can be aggregated and distributed by a set of reinsurers.
This is good news for the customer-led organization strategy because it means that groups small enough to engage in active
participatory decisionmaking nonetheless are large enough to buy
insurance or to self-fund, given sufficient financial protection supplied by reinsurance, guaranty funds, and the like. It is not at all
difficult to imagine creating a family of private organizations that
would be able to regulate the risk-pooling relationships through
private collective action.
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The next problem is pricing. I have argued that the reason why
the employer-based plans have been so successful in providing coverage for higher-risk individuals is that their funding comes not in
the form of premiums paid by employees but rather as a share of
the revenues generated by the business. Non-premium financing
does not eliminate completely the incentive to engage in member
selection on the basis of health risk, but it provides other bases for
evaluating desirability. Taft-Hartley plans furnish examples of various non-premium pricing structures. Any non-premium technique
of financing will require explicit decisions on the part of the members of the organization, which is both the burden and the
advantage of customer-led entities. It is worth keeping in mind that
because efficient pricing leads to the death spiral, efficiency is not
the goal.
Finally there is the question of stability. In the current system,
because employees have few choices with respect to risk pools any
employer's plan will consist of almost all the employees to which
the plan is offered. Employers sponsoring single-employer plans
therefore need fear adverse selection only through the creation
and destruction of employment relationships. A multiple-employer
or customer-led plan may not enjoy these advantages: because individuals eligible for its coverage may have other choices available
as a result of the employment relationship, as perhaps a choice between the plan offered by an employer and one offered by the
trade association, any particular plan needs to fear being selected
against in ways that confound its actuarial projections based on
population-level information about the pool of eligible persons. At
the extreme, if employees had many options-as if, for example,
they could choose to be covered by their fraternal organization or
church in preference to their employer-all risk-pooling groups
would be relatively unable because of fluid boundaries and would
have to fear adverse selection. This problem can be solved by making entry into an insurance group relatively challenging (as by
imposing affinity requirements) and making exit challenging
enough to deter casual adverse selection but not so difficult as to
deprive an individual of medically responsible choice of plan and
provider. The latter can be accomplished by, for example, offering
coverage in multi-year contracts with penalties for early cancellation.
Finally, there is the problem of access to risk capital. Nonprofit
status is not inherently inconsistent with the acquisition of funds
from persons who are willing to risk the loss of them in business
operations; nor is it inconsistent with searching out new markets.
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Customer-led cooperative organizations generally raise capital
from their members and have some ability to serve customers who
are not their members. In the case of health services, it is easy to
imagine that business firms might launch and finance a customerled health plan, purchasing, or management entity. It is not
farfetched to imagine large purchasers of health benefits forming
ventures with attractive providers that allow the customers to contribute capital to the provider's operations.
Much becomes possible if we turn our minds to the solution of
the problems posed by the current state of managed care. The
forces of commercial entrepreneurship have been allowed to
claim, by default, a territory that is not properly theirs. In many
respects the turn to for-profit managed care has been a great success; but present difficulties suggest that it is time to moderate our
enthusiasm for the invisible hand and to engage in conscious design.
Let me leave this subject with a last thought. In the American
system, tax-financed governance is a scarce resource and public
tolerance for regulation is limited. Moreover, legislation and regulation are not themselves perfect or perfectible instruments for
achieving the greater good: interest-group politics tend to direct
legislative efforts into channels cut by private interest, and the actual performance of regulatory programs will reflect the capacity
and competence of the government agencies to which implementation responsibility has been assigned. The current large trend in
American political life seems to be to reduce the capacity and
competence of government by reducing its revenues and personnel. Under these circumstances it seems incautious to design major
new regulatory tasks for government unless the tasks are urgent
and the objectives cannot be achieved by other means. It is also
unrealistic to think that because the tasks are important the resources will be committed. The combination of large tasks and
under-nourished capacities may well leave the situation worse off.
Reliance on commercial managed care organizations selling what
amounts to individual insurance requires an immense regulatory
apparatus that it is unrealistic to expect the Congress and the state
legislatures to create or government organizations, under present
conditions, to manage.
It is preferable, therefore, to assign health care management responsibilities to institutions that can work independently, with
modest intervention or support from public entities and minimal
public funding and that can manage their local issues through private ordering and private law. The nonprofit organizations and
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employer-based health benefit plans have historically been able to
do this. My argument is that in the interest of not squandering a
large social resource that is already in place and is accustomed to
acting independently of, but in cooperation with, government, we
should help these institutions adapt successfully to the new economy of health care. Untrammeled commercialism in the private
sector leads, as we now see, to a demand for extensive regulation
by the public sector, and pushes all issues up to a level at which patient interests cease to be the principal drivers of the action, as
large amounts of money from insurer and provider interests flood
into the political area and governments express their own interests
as purchasers and regulators. The resulting contests of large powers tend to make political conversation about health policy lose
detail and nuance, flatten into slogan and accusation. Large structural issues such as the redesign of Medicare must be resolved as
problems of governance structure and public finance, but many of
the issues of coverage design and administration that would be resolved by the current burst of managed care reform legislation are
matters that could be handled better through responsible private
governance and contract, as in the health services sector. The present challenge is how to create responsible private governance for
health care in the new economy.
In this as in all other matters, the price of liberty is self-restraint
and social responsibility. The health care system is breaking down
all around us. It will be fixed, whether well or poorly. Current
policy that has pushed radically toward a fix based on
commercialism has evidently failed; to overlay the commercialism
with government regulation does not seem more promising,
because government regulation comes with its own known
tendencies toward regulatory capture and policy failure. The better
course seems to be to fix the system by building responsible
customer-centered private organizations using the capabilities that
already exist in the employer-based plans and nonprofit
institutions. Taking this path will require, however, that the private
sector design institutions that are stable in the face of short-term
financial exigencies of individual businesses and that explicitly
engage in quasi-governmental functions. I do not mean to
underestimate the challenge of building stable access to medical
services through private institutions and public-private partnerships; I only mean to suggest that this is the only course of action
that can succeed in stabilizing the present situation and moving
toward universal coverage and access to quality care. It also bears
noting that customer-centered private organizations hold out the
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best promise of solving the problems of patient privacy that are
looming in the age of digitized information.
This argument has not addressed any of the specific managed
care reform legislative measures proposed or enacted. It does,
however, suggest a principle for evaluating them, which is that in
the current drive for managed care reform we ought to be careful
not to impose regulation or liability that seems likely to drive away
from the function of providing health benefits any substantial
number of private employers. In the end, the health care sector
must be brought within the ordinary principles of tort and contract
law and must be responsible and accountable to public authority as
well as private interests. However, in the current legislative climate
when so much is proposed and so little understood, it might be
well to stay the harshest hand unless one is certain that one is not
demolishing the possibility of a more attractive future.

